Does policing the police increase crime? We avoid simultaneity effects of increased public oversight following an officer-involved shooting scandal by identifying events in Chicago that only impacted officers’ self-monitoring. We estimate crimes’ response to types of over- sight using generalized synthetic control methods. Cautionary notes from the police union, inducing officers to self-monitor, significantly reduced Constitutional violation complaints without increasing crime. In contrast, complaints and crime rise post-scandal. This suggests that higher crime following more oversight results not solely from depolicing but also from civilian behavior simultaneously changing. Our research suggests that proactive accountability improves police resident interactions without increasing crime.

This paper examines the impact of in-group bias on the internal dynamics of a police department. Prior studies have documented racial bias in policing, but little is known about bias against officers due to lack of available data. We construct a novel panel dataset of Chicago Police Department officers with detailed personnel information. Exploiting quasi-random variation in supervisor assignment, we find that white supervisors are less likely to nominate black officers than white or Hispanic officers. There is weaker evidence that male supervisors are less likely to nominate female officers than male officers. We explore several theories of discrimination that can explain our main findings. Requiring interaction between supervisors and officers reduces the minority nomination gap, but white supervisors still exhibit in-group favoritism. Our findings suggest departments should focus on policies that address in-group bias due to its effect on career advancement.

We study the link between police officers' on-duty injuries and their peers' force use using a network of officers who attended the police academy together through a random lottery. On-duty injuries increase the probability of officers using force by 7 percent in the subsequent week. Officers are also more likely to injure suspects and receive complaints about neglecting victims and violating constitutional rights. The effect is concentrated in a narrow time window following the event and is not associated with significantly lower injury risk to the officer. Together, these findings suggest that emotional responses drive the effects rather than social learning.

Diversification is a widely proposed policing reform, but its impact is difficult to assess. We used records of millions of daily patrol assignments, determined through fixed rules and preassigned rotations that mitigate self-selection, to compare the average behavior of officers of different demographic profiles working in comparable conditions. Relative to white officers, Black and Hispanic officers make far fewer stops and arrests, and they use force less often, especially against Black civilians. These effects are largest in majority-Black areas of Chicago and stem from reduced focus on enforcing low-level offenses, with greatest impact on Black civilians. Female officers also use less force than males, a result that holds within all racial groups. These results suggest that diversity reforms can improve police treatment of minority communities.

This paper studies the effect of pretrial electronic monitoring (EM) as an alternative to both pretrial release and pretrial detention (jail) in Cook County, Illinois. EM often involves a defendant wearing an electronic ankle bracelet that tracks their movement and aims to deter pretrial misconduct. Using the quasi-random assignment of bond court judges, I estimate the effect of EM versus release and EM versus detention on pretrial misconduct, case outcomes, and future recidivism. I develop a novel method for the semiparametric estimation of marginal treatment effects in ordered choice environments, with which I construct relevant treatment effects. Relative to release, EM increases new cases pretrial due to bond violations while reducing new cases for low-level crimes and failures to appear in court. Relative to detention, EM increases low-level pretrial misconduct but improves defendant case outcomes and reduces cost-weighted future recidivism. Finally, I bound EM's pretrial crime reduction effect. I find that EM is likely an adequate substitute for pretrial detention. However, it is not clear that EM prevents enough high-cost crime to justify its use relative to release, particularly for defendants who are more likely to be released.

A common proposal to improve US policing is to increase minority representation in police departments. The net effect of such policies depends on the direct effect of the minority officers as well as their peer effect on others. I document the effect of minority peers in the Chicago police academy on officers' future arrests by exploiting the lottery system which provides exogenous variation in the composition of academy cohorts. I find that minority (e.g., Black, Hispanic) peers reduce officers' future propensity to arrest minority civilians through a reduction in low-quality, low-level arrests. For example, a 1 standard deviation increase in Black cohort share decreases future arrests of Black civilians for low-level crimes by about 1 arrest per 100 officer-shifts. Additional results suggest that other peer characteristics, such as age and gender, modify the effect of minority peers, which is consistent with peers' preferences for aggressive policing playing an important role beyond their minority status.

Do investors anticipate that demands for racial equity will impact companies? We explore this question in the context of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement---the largest racially motivated protest movement in U.S. history---and its effect on the U.S. policing industry using a novel dataset on publicly traded firms contracting with the police. It is unclear whether the BLM uprisings were likely to increase or decrease market valuations of firms contracting heavily with police because of the increased interest in reforming the police, fears over rising crime, and pushes to "defund the police". We find, in contrast to the predictions of economics experts we surveyed, that in the three weeks following incidents triggering BLM uprisings, policing firms experienced a stock price increase of seven percentage points relative to the stock prices of nonpolicing firms in similar industries. In particular, firms producing surveillance technology and police accountability tools experienced higher returns following BLM activism--related events. Furthermore, policing firms' fundamentals, such as sales, improved after the murder of George Floyd, suggesting that policing firms' future performances bore out investors' positive expectations following incidents triggering BLM uprisings. Our research shows how---despite BLM’s calls to reduce investment in policing and explore alternative public safety approaches---the financial market has translated high-profile violence against Black civilians and calls for systemic change into shareholder gains and additional revenues for police suppliers.

Given police abolitionism’s new visibility after the 2020 racial justice protests, we assess stakeholder beliefs on the protests’ stock impacts on police-affiliated firms. Experts generally underestimate the firms’ stock gains, except situated experts like community organizers and police experts, who link the market responses to reforms, not budget cuts. An experiment with nonexperts and finance professionals shows negatively skewed stock predictions among respondents lacking information on policing products and no effect of exposure to narratives about the protests on forecast alignment. National data show enduring support for police reform despite abolitionist advocacy and little understanding of the Defund movement’s objectives.

Policies to make police forces more representative of communities have centered on race. But race may crudely proxy views and lived experiences, undermining classic theories of representative bureaucracy. To conduct a multi-dimensional analysis, we merge personnel records, voter files and census data to examine roughly 220,000 officers from 97 of the 100 largest local U.S. agencies—over one third of local law enforcement agents nationwide. We show officers skew more White, Republican, politically active, male, and high-income than their jurisdictions; they also surround themselves with similarly unrepresentative neighbors. In a quasi-experimental analysis in Chicago, we find Democratic and minority officers initiate fewer stops, arrests, and uses of force than Republican and White counterparts facing common circumstances. The Black-White behavioral gap is often far larger than the Democratic-Republican gap, a pattern not observed among Hispanic officers. Our results complicate conventional understandings of descriptive representation, highlighting the importance of multi-dimensional perspectives of diversity.

We develop an empirical model of the mechanism used to assign police officers to Chicago districts and examine the efficiency and equity of alternative allocations. We document that the current bidding process, which grants priority based on seniority, results in the assignment of more experienced officers to less violent and high-income neighborhoods. Our empirical model combines estimates of heterogeneous officer preferences underlying the bidding process with causal estimates of the effects of officer experience on neighborhood crime.

Equalizing officer seniority across districts would reduce violent crime rate by 4.6 percent and significantly decrease inequality in crime, discretionary arrests, and officer use of force across neighborhoods. Moreover, this assignment can be achieved in a revenue-neutral way while resulting in small welfare gains for police officers, implying that it is more equitable and efficient.